Governance assessment tool: Institutional capacity by Kuks, S.M.M. et al.
 Governance assessment tool – Institutional capacity 
 
Stefan Kuks, Hans Bressers, Cheryl de Boer, Joanne Vinke, Gül Özerol 
University of Twente, 26 April 2012 
 
 
 
1. Introduction: Resource regimes 
 
For the assessment of the institutional capacity in water governance we make use 
of the concept of resource regimes. Resource regimes are considered as social 
institutions which have an effect on the stock and the yield of the natural 
resource. Resources provide different goods and services as a yield. Resources 
give rise to either direct use (e.g. as input factors in production processes or the 
direct consumption option), indirect use (e.g. adsorption sink for pollutants, 
ecosystem services) or immaterial use (e.g. in the form of landscape, amenity, 
aesthetic, cultural values) by people. The concept resource regime advocates that 
the management and preservation of a natural resource should be understood not 
only in terms of public management (top down), but also in terms of civil or social 
action and selfregulation by society on the basis of property and use rights 
(bottom up). Water uses are influenced not only by policy interventions, but also 
by the rights that have been established. Therefore, resource regimes are 
considered as social institutions in which the public and private domains interact 
with each other. (Coase, 1960; Young, 1982; Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1991; 
Young, 1992; Crawford & Ostrom, 1995; Knoepfel, Kissling & Varone, 2001; 
Bressers & Kuks, 2001; Kissling & Kuks, 2004). 
 
In fact, the essence of water governance is that its focus is not only on public 
intervention, but also on self-organisation as a way to deal with water issues. It 
combines a top down perspective from governmental agencies with the bottom 
up perspective of stakeholders having an interest in water management. There 
are lots of examples of bottom up organizations in water management. Many of 
them have a long history of self-organisation, like the ‘Waterschappen’ in the 
Netherlands, the ‘Wateringues’ in Belgium (Wallonia), the ‘Wasserbehörde’ and 
‘Wasserverbände’ in Germany, the ‘Agences de l’Eau’ in France,  the 
‘Confederaciones Hidrográficas’ and the ‘Tribunales de las Aguas’ in Spain, or the 
organisations for water irrigation (Les Bisses/Suonen) in Switzerland (Canton of 
Wallis). But also outside Europe, we can find many of such bottom up 
organisations, for instance the Water Management Districts in the American state 
of Florida (Kuks & Bressers, 2003). Ostrom (1990) emphasises in her book 
‘Governing the Commons’ the importance of regional and local institutional 
arrangements (common pool resource arrangements) which are often based on a 
long tradition of informal but commonly shared water rights. In Europe, Barraqué 
(1995, 1998) made an analysis of the influence of water rights on the 
administration in various European countries. He remarks that the local character 
of “customary institutions makes them less visible to those who primarily focus 
on legal; systems or regulations at State level” (Barraqué, 1998: 353-354). In 
their book on water use principles in the Middle East, Allan and Mallat (1995) 
remark that such water use principles are often based on old Islamic rules and 
customs. “Water in these regions tells the story of society and its modes of being 
shared are still today a real document on social order” (Allan & Mallat, 1995: 6-
9). However, self-regulation often takes place in “the shadow of hierarchy” 
(Scharpf, 1997), which means in the context of the possibility of public 
intervention. Generally speaking, self-regulation does not only result from 
“laissez-fair” but can also result from the credible alternative threat of public 
intervention. 
 
 
 
2. Regime dimensions 
 
We use ‘resource regimes’ and ‘governance regimes’ as equivalent concepts. 
Assessment of a governance regime should be based on identifying the regime 
and evaluating the regime with criteria. For the identification of a regime we 
distinguish five dimensions: 
1. Levels and scales (not necessarily administrative levels): governance assumes 
a general multi-level character of all other dimensions. 
2. Actors and their networks: governance assumes the multi-actor character of 
the relevant network(s). 
3. Perceptions of the problem and goal ambitions (not just the objectives): 
governance assumes the multi-faceted character of the problems and 
ambitions.  
4. Strategies and instruments: governance assumes the multi-instrumental 
character of the strategies of the actors involved. 
5. Resources and organization of implementation: governance assumes the 
complex multi-resource basis for implementation. 
 
These five dimensions have been elaborated on the basis of a variety of classics 
in policy studies literature (for an overview see: Bressers & Kuks, 2001, 2003). 
They make also sense if we consider the concept of ‘institutional sustainability’ as 
introduced by the EU Water Framework Directive. In 2000 the European Union 
adopted the Water Framework Directive to streamline the EU's large body of 
water legislation into one overarching strategy. The Water Framework Directive 
imposes a general requirement for ecological protection and a minimum chemical 
standard for all surface waters. The key element of the directive is the 
introduction of a model for water management based on 'river basins', or 
geographical areas, rather than on administrative or political boundaries. The key 
aims of the Directive are: 
• Expanding the scope of water protection to all waters, surface waters and 
groundwater. 
• Achieving "good status" for all waters by a set deadline. 
• Water management based on river basins (following the example of e.g. 
Maas, Rhine and Scheldt across-the-borders river basins management). 
• "Combined approach" of emission limit values and quality standards. 
• Getting the prices right (adequate water pricing acts as an incentive for the 
sustainable use of water resources). 
• Getting the citizen involved more closely; 
• Streamlining legislation (replacing seven old water directives). 
 
In fact, the institutional sustainability criteria in the European Water Framework 
Directive fit quite well with the five dimensions of governance we distinguish: 
1. Levels and scales: water management at river basin scale. 
2. Actors and networks: getting the citizen and all users involved more closely 
(participation). 
3. Perceptions and ambitions: expanding the scope and achieving “good status” 
for all water bodies. 
4. Strategies and instruments: streamlining legislation and combined approach 
(integration). 
5. Responsibilities and resources for implementation: getting the prices right 
(redistribution of costs). 
 
Thinking of ways to develop a governance regime towards more institutional 
sustainability, one could think of the following directions for institutional change:  
1. Restructuring levels and scales (positioning the river basin level and 
organizing water management based on watershed boundaries); 
2. Involving new actors (developing participatory arrangements for involvement 
of all users and stakeholders with an interest); 
3. Reformulating the policy problem (developing an integral vision including all 
water values); 
4. Integrating policies (using integrated water legislation, integrated planning 
and integrated water resource management); 
5. Redistributing resources (limiting property and use rights, internalizing costs, 
full cost recovery). 
 
An analytical framework based on these five dimensions has been applied for 
national regime studies in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Italy, 
Switzerland (Kissling and Kuks 2004, Bressers and Kuks 2004, 2006), the United 
Kingdom (Kuks 2005), Greece (Kampa and Bressers 2008), Romania (Vinke-de 
Kruijf, Kuks and Augustijn 2010), Palestina-Gaza (Zoarob and Bressers 2007)and 
Vietnam (De Boer, Bressers and Filatova 2010; Kuks 2012).  
 
 
 
3. Regime qualities 
 
Besides the identification of a regime, an assessment asks for qualification of a 
regime. In literature on resource regimes various authors advocate the relevance 
of ‘extent’ and ‘coherence’ as assessment criteria (Young, 1982; Knoepfel et al. 
2001; Kissling and Kuks, 2004).  
 
a. The extent of a regime refers to the scope of issues taken into account, the 
completeness and the comprehensiveness. The extent of a regime concerns 
its inclusiveness with respect to all uses or values related to a water resource. 
 
b. The coherence of a regime refers to the degree to which the various elements 
of the regime are strengthening rather than weakening each other. Paying 
attention to more separate issues only adds to complexity and fragmentation 
when it is not accompanied by thoughtful connections. Young (1982) argues 
that resource regimes need to be accompanied by administrative 
organizations and policies, especially to cope with problems of interpretation 
and dispute settlement. 
 
When the challenge is not to keep the water system in a stable sustainable 
status, but to change it to adapt to changing situations like population growth and 
climate change, water management will further increase in complexity and 
dynamics, to the point that any linear plan and realize approach is doomed to fail. 
Adaptive water management in practice is then essential. But the necessary 
adaptiveness comes with additional governance regime requirements. When the 
regime is for some part rigid in what it required, for instance by detailing various 
sub-goals and timeframes, the degrees of freedom for water management in 
practice may shrink to unworkable conditions. Water management processes in 
practice require applying “adaptive boundary spanning strategies” (Bressers and 
Lulofs 2010). To enable these, the governance regime should not only have 
sufficient extent and coherence, but also provide sufficient flexibility (De Boer 
2012).  
 
c. The flexibility of a regime refers to the degree to which the regime elements 
support and facilitate adaptive actions and strategies in as far as the 
ambitions are served by this adaptiveness (De Boer and Bressers 2011). 
Consequently it is also the degree to which hindrances for such adaptive 
behavior are avoided. The addition “in as far as” is needed to discern 
implementation that is just weak from a genuine attempt to make the most of 
the situation. 
 
Given the dynamic and change oriented nature of some policies, like river 
renaturalization, there is yet another regime quality that can be influential for the 
practical process. That is the obvious, but no less important aspect of intensity.  
 
d. The intensity of a regime refers to the degree to which the regime elements 
urge changes in the status quo or in current developments. Intensity is 
related to the size of the task to create new dynamics by creative cooperation, 
or conflict. Consequently this urges change of conservative motivations or 
overcoming them by power, changing cognitions including widening of 
boundary judgments regarding the issues at stake, and developing new 
availabilities and combinations of resources. In other words: with more 
intensity the urge to use cleaver adaptive strategies to deal with and change 
the setting of the process increases. On the other hand, inevitably there will 
be some limitations to flexibility induced by an increase in intensity, in 
ambitions and stimuli to further change. 
 
We identified four qualities that are important to be assessed while analyzing the 
aptness of a governance regime in a certain situation: extent, coherence, 
flexibility and intensity. These criteria qualify the regime in terms of its impact on 
real life processes. The four mentioned qualities of governance can be applied to 
all five elements of governance. This then creates a matrix of issues that are 
relevant for the degree to which the governance context guides and facilitates 
effective water management processes in practice.  
 
 
 
4. Questionnaire for regime assessment 
 
A combination of the five regime dimensions and the four regime qualities has 
been operationalized into the following questionnaire. The questionnaire is also 
available as a matrix scheme (see Appendix 1). 
 
1. Multi-level governance 
There is not one only level of government, but many layers of government on 
national, regional/provincial and local scale.  
 
What are important questions to discuss? 
• In terms of extent: How many levels are involved and dealing with an issue? 
Are there important gaps or missing levels? 
• In terms of coherence: Do these levels work together and do they trust other 
between levels? 
• In terms of flexibility: Is it possible to move up and down levels (up scaling 
and downscaling) given the issue at stake? 
• In terms of intensity: Is there a strong impact from a certain level to change 
behaviour? 
 
2. Multi-actor governance 
Actors that are involved do mostly not act on their own, but also on behalf of 
backbenchers or interest groups behind them which they represent. It is relevant 
to consider the network linkages around actors and the coalitions that exist.  
 
What are important questions to discuss? 
• In terms of extent: Are all relevant stakeholders involved? Who are excluded? 
• In terms of coherence: What is the strength of interactions between 
stakeholders? In what way are these interactions institutionalised in joint 
structures? What is the history of working together, is there a tradition of 
cooperation? 
• In terms of flexibility: Is it practised that the lead shifts from one actor to 
another? 
• In terms of intensity: Is there a strong impact from an actor or actor coalition 
on water management? 
 
3. Multi-perspective governance 
Different actors have different perspectives on a policy problem. There are 
various discourses in which groups of actors perceive and discuss a problem. Also 
goal ambitions vary among actors. 
 
What are important questions to discuss? 
• In terms of extent: To what extent are the various problem perspectives 
taken care off? 
• In terms of coherence: To what extent do the various goals support each 
other, or are they in competition? 
• In terms of flexibility: Are there opportunities to re-assess goals? 
• In terms of intensity: How different are goal ambitions form the status quo? 
 
4. Multi-instrument governance 
To be effective, it is necessary to have a strategy for goal achievement, including 
a variety of policy instruments to be applied. 
 
What are important questions to discuss? 
• In terms of extent: What types of instruments are included in the policy 
strategy? 
• In terms of coherence: To what extent is the resulting incentive system based 
on synergy? 
• In terms of flexibility: Are there opportunities to combine or make use of 
different types of instruments? Is there a choice? 
• In terms of intensity: What is the implied behavioural deviation from current 
practice and how strongly do the instruments require and enforce this? 
 
5. Multi-resource governance 
It is not sufficient to have a policy strategy on paper. It needs implementation to 
become effective. Implementation often takes place at another, lower level of 
government. The effectiveness depends on the responsibilities (competences, 
mandates) that are assigned and on the resources that are available at or 
provided to that lower level of government. Important resources are: authority, 
trust, property rights, financial means, organisational capacity, human resources, 
expertise, information and knowledge, time. 
 
What are important questions to discuss? 
• In terms of extent: Are responsibilities clearly assigned and sufficiently 
facilitated with resources? 
• In terms of coherence: To what extent do the assigned responsibilities create 
competence struggles or cooperation within or across institutions? 
• In terms of flexibility: What is the flexibility within the assigned responsibility 
to apply resources in order to do the right thing in an accountable and 
transparent way? 
• In terms of intensity: Is the amount of applied resources sufficient for the 
intended change? 
 
 
5. Regime dynamics: pressure points and doorstep conditions 
 
The questionnaire in the previous section helps us to make a regime assessment 
of the static situation and the dynamics.  
• In the matrix we could assess each matrix cell for instance with the help of a 
smiley (ordinal scale), expressing the quality of the regime in terms of 
high/medium/low extent, coherence, flexibility, intensity on each of the five 
dimensions.  
• We can also assess the dynamics in each matrix cell with the help of an arrow 
up or down, to express if the situation is improving or endangering.  
 
Such an assessment will result into quick scan conclusions for improvement of the 
governance regime in a specific country or setting. Appendix 2 gives an example 
of such quick scan conclusions for the governance regime of the Mekong Delta in 
Vietnam. These conclusions have been adopted in the first draft of the Mekong 
Delta Plan in Vietnam.  
 
For a further feasibility assessment of quick scan conclusions it makes sense to 
focus the analysis on triggers, drivers or pressure points that press the 
governance regime towards change. Furthermore, it is important to be aware of 
the mechanisms or conditions that determine if and how change will take place.  
• Triggers of pressure points can be classified according to the type of context 
where they stem from. Bressers & Lulofs (2010) distinguish in their 
Contextual Interaction Theory: 
o The specific context (previous decisions, specific circumstances or 
cases). 
o The structural context (the five dimensions of a governance regime). 
o The wider contexts (problem context, political context, economic 
context, cultural context, technological context). 
• Whether change will happen or will be inhibited depends on mechanisms or 
conditions that determine the effect of triggers or pressure points. For 
instance, North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) identified doorstep conditions 
that determine if a natural state will begin a transition towards an open access 
order. We distinguish three path dependency mechanisms that create stability 
in a regime, which beyond a certain point can also be pathways for changes 
(Bressers & Kuks, 2001; Kuks, 2004). These mechanisms function as doorstep 
conditions that are favourable or not favourable for regime change. 
o A dominant set of values (motivation). 
o A dominant cognitive frame of reference (cognitions). 
o A dominant power configuration (mutual dependencies between 
actors).  
 
Dominant set of values 
This first doorstep condition arises from the tendency of actors to act from a set 
of constant and coherent values (objectives: ‘will’; normative component). In our 
comparative study of national water regimes in six European countries (Kissling 
and Kuks, 2004) we found indications that the following values and value-based 
institutions are in favour of an integrated water resource regime: 
• A strong value placed on community spirit, including willingness to restrict 
individual autonomy to achieve equitable distribution of water access rights.  
• Common adherence to the polluter pays principle and the principle of full cost 
recovery. 
• A cooperative policy style (with participatory values), including openness of 
the water policy community to rival interests. 
• A strong environmental awareness in society, including a protective 
orientation and openness of the legal system to ‘protective interests’.  
On a more specific case level (Bressers and Kuks, 2004) we found indications for 
the relevance of a ‘tradition of cooperation’: 
• A dominant policy ideology that supports integration. 
• Positive examples of integration known by the actors involved. 
• Mutual respect and trust in ‘fair play’ by the actors involved. 
 
Dominant cognitive reference frame 
This second doorstep condition arises from the tendency of actors to use a 
common reference frame to interpret cognitions (information: ‘knowledge’). In 
our comparative study of national water regimes in six European countries 
(Kissling and Kuks, 2004) we found indications that the following paradigms and 
cognition-based institutions are in favour of an integrated water resource regime: 
• A common understanding of water problems in terms of resource 
sustainability and not in terms of isolated problems that can be resolved with 
curative solutions (treatment of the symptoms). 
• A water planning tradition and the presence of a supportive learning system 
(in the sense of national statistics, science and research). 
• The ability to adapt existing water institutions to an expanding extent (to 
innovate within existing water institutions and broaden their scope). 
On a more specific case level (Bressers and Kuks, 2004) we found indications for 
the relevance of ‘joint problems and joint opportunities’: 
• Common knowledge bases from respected sources on problems and 
opportunities. 
• Information symmetry between the actors involved on these points 
• A sense of responsibility for the future with the actors involved and a sense of 
respect for each other’s interests among the actors involved. 
 
Dominant power configuration 
This third doorstep condition arises from the dependence of actors on each 
other’s resources (power: ‘ability’). In our comparative study of national water 
regimes in six European countries (Kissling and Kuks, 2004) we found indications 
that the following indicators of a power configuration are in favour of an 
integrated water resource regime: 
• A tradition of effective co-governance between central and decentral 
authorities (in which central authorities take responsibility for integration and 
decentral authorities are equipped with sufficient resources for the 
implementation and the differentiation to specific circumstances). 
• A tradition of citizen participation and public debate on water issues (in which 
participation is not restricted to general elections, but in which participation 
rights are instituted regarding water policy making and planning). 
• A strong environmental policy sector (with environmental divisions at all 
administrative levels and environmental subdivisions in all relevant ministries 
and water administrations). 
• A strong position of ‘green’ NGOs. 
• Free and alert mass media to induce awareness of challenges to the system. 
On a more specific case level (Bressers and Kuks, 2004) we found indications for 
the relevance of ‘institutional interfaces’: 
• Clarity of assigned responsibilities (to prevent territorial battles). 
• Legal or practical possibilities to protect negotiated compromises from 
continuous litigation. 
• Actors, independent or within the administration, with solely process 
objectives (brokers). 
• We also found indications for the relevance of a socalled ‘credible alternative 
threat’: 
• Sufficient imbalance of power favouring a dominant actor (government?) to 
enable unilateral action. 
• Information on alternative options to ‘solve’ the problem from the perspective 
of the dominant’s actor’s perspective. 
• Alternative option has more severe consequences for the other stakeholders 
than the specific form of integration would have. 
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Appendix 1:  
Questionnaire for regime assessment 
  
 
Governance 
dimension 
Quality of the governance regime 
Extent Coherence Flexibility Intensity 
Levels and scales  
How many levels are involved and 
dealing with an issue? Are there 
any important gaps or missing 
levels? 
Do these levels work together and 
do they trust other between levels? 
Is it possible to move up and 
down levels (upscaling and 
downscaling) given the issue at 
stake? 
Is there a strong impact 
from a certain level to 
change behaviour? 
Actors and 
networks 
Are all relevant stakeholders 
involved? Who are excluded? 
What is the strength of interactions 
between stakeholders? In what way 
are these interactions 
institutionalised in joint structures? 
What is the history of working 
together, is there a tradition of 
cooperation? 
Is it practised that the lead 
shifts from one actor to 
another? 
Is there a strong impact 
from an actor or actor 
coalition on water 
management? 
Problem 
perspectives and 
goal ambitions 
To what extent are the various 
problem perspectives taken care 
off? 
To what extent do the various goals 
support each other, or Are they in 
competition? 
Are there opportunities to re-
assess goals? 
How different are the goal 
ambitions from the status 
quo? 
Strategies and 
instruments 
What types of instruments are 
included in the policy strategy? 
To what extent is the resulting 
incentive system based on synergy? 
Are there opportunities to 
combine or make use of 
different types of instruments? 
Is there a choice? 
What is the implied 
behavioural deviation from 
current practice and How 
strongly do the instruments 
require and enforce this? 
Responsibilities 
and resources 
Are responsibilities clearly assigned 
and sufficiently facilitated with 
resources? 
To what extent do the assigned 
responsibilities create competence 
struggles or cooperation within or 
across institutions? 
What is the flexibility within the 
assigned responsibility to apply 
resources in order to do the 
right thing in an accountable 
and transparent way? 
Is the amount of applied 
resources sufficient for the 
intended change? 
 
Appendix 2:  
Quick scan conclusions for the water governance regime in the Mekong 
Delta in Vietnam 
 
Included in chapter 6 of the Mekong Delta Plan V0.1 (March 2012). 
Approved by the Strategic Advisors Team (Cees Veerman, Louise Fresco, Marcel 
Stive, Han Vrijling, Pavel Kabat, Stefan Kuks). 
 
Long term vision based water management in the Mekong Delta takes into 
account how climate change might affect use functions in the delta. This Mekong 
Delta Plan aims to provide such a long term vision. It identifies what basic choices 
have to made to improve the socio-economic development of the Delta, given the 
impact of climate change as a circumstance. But having such a plan is not 
enough. To implement the plan in an effective way, it is necessary to 
institutionalise the way of thinking and the way of working on which this plan is 
built. It is crucial to organise a strong form of coordination at the scale of the 
entire river basin and delta area on the Vietnamese side. Therefore, in this 
chapter we want to elaborate on the delta coordination that is needed to bring 
the Mekong Delta Plan into practice in an effective way. It is a reflection on the 
water governance in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam. 
 
If we apply an assessment tool for water governance in the Mekong Delta in 
Vietnam, and make a quick scan, than we come to the following main 
conclusions. These conclusions have been approved by the High Level Meetings 
for the Mekong Delta Plan in 2010 and 2011 in Hanoi and HCMC. 
 
 
1. Coordination needed at river basin scale 
 
The scale of the river basin in Vietnam, the entire delta, covers 13 provinces. 
These provinces all have their own policies with respect to land use functions and 
water management in the Delta. The provinces are implementing national policies 
along sectoral lines, like agriculture and rural development (Mard), natural 
resources and environment (Monre), construction (MoC), transport (MoT). 
Integration of sectoral policies should take place at the national level, but this 
does not function sufficiently. Integration of sectoral lines at provincial level is 
rather weak. So, interpolicy cooperation at national and provincial level is 
insufficient and causes fragmentation. An integrated approach of land use 
functions requires coordination among the disciplinary organised ministries and 
departments. Land use planning is too much dominated by agriculture and the 
emphasis on rice production, which hinders crop rotation. Lands use functions are 
rather inflexible due to inflexible property rights and land use rights. Coordination 
between the 13 provinces is also lacking, they don’t have sufficient orientation on 
each other to achieve for instance a good coordinated approach of upstream and 
downstream water problems. The provincial orientation is too much top down, 
which means focus on implementation of agreements with national ministries, 
and too little on taking responsibility for delta problems that pop up in a bottom 
up perspective from the delta itself.  
 
Following this reasoning, improvements can be made in the following ways: 
• Coordination among the 13 provinces (upstream-downstream coordination). 
Organise a platform on which the 13 provinces can meet each other on Delta 
matters. Stimulate that they develop more orientation on each other, of 
course within national policy frames. An integrated approach on the relation 
between upstream and downstream matters is needed. Relevant matters to 
consider are flooding, drought and water shortage, salinity.  
• Coordination of use functions (interpolicy coordination). Stimulate provincial 
policy makers to broaden the scope and stimulate them to develop 
comprehensive visions in which related aspects from Mard-, Monre-, MoC- and 
MoT-policies are taken together. An integrated approach on the relations 
between various use functions is needed. Relevant use functions to consider 
are agricultural and rural development, urban and infrastructural 
development, environmental and natural resource functions. Interpolicy 
coordination should result in the allowance of more flexibility in land use 
functions and land use rights. 
• Cross border coordination. Development of a better coordination at the scale 
of the Mekong Delta in Vietnam will strengthen the international position of 
Vietnam in relation to the upstream countries along the international Mekong 
river basin. With international help from abroad (for instance with the help of 
experts at Clingendael Institute in The Netherlands or at IIASA in Austria) the 
ability to work on water diplomacy could be improved.  
 
 
2. Stakeholder representation and governmental authorisation needed at river 
basin scale 
 
Water governance in the Mekong delta is not only a matter for governmental 
bodies. Also non-governmental bodies or stakeholders with an interest should 
have the opportunity to be involved. This is needed to achieve a comprehensive 
vision on people’s needs. Ideally speaking, all water users, user groups and use 
functions in the Delta should have a chance to make their argument in the 
coordination at river basin scale. The coordination at river basin scale should be 
aimed at dealing with rivalries between users and user functions. It should 
include conflict prevention and resolution mechanisms. It must be organised as a 
collective choice arrangement. On the other hand, such an arrangement needs 
governmental authorisation. In the Vietnamese governmental system it is the 
People’s Committee that functions as the political body or assemble that could 
provide such authorisation. If we exclude the option of a special People’s 
Committee at the level of the entire Mekong Delta, we can think of authorisation 
from a People’s Committee at another level in the existing structure, or provincial 
level, or national level. To achieve an integrated and powerful approach, it would 
be better to think of authorisation from the national level. 
 
Following this reasoning, improvements can be made in the following ways: 
• Stakeholder representation at river basin scale. Organise a stakeholder 
platform at river basin scale on which stakeholders can make their argument, 
on which rivalries will be debated and identified, and on which collective 
choices, that are to be made for the Mekong Delta, will be prepared. 
• Governmental authorisation at river basin scale. Organise strong leadership in 
collective choice decision making at river basin scale, to be authorised and 
anchored by the national government. Strongly recommended is to create 
position for a Delta Commissioner that takes leadership in decision making, 
but based on processes in which stakeholders are consulted. Such processes 
are to be set up and facilitated by the Delta Commissioner and his staff. It is 
also strongly recommended that the Delta Commissioner takes office in the 
Delta area itself instead of in the capital Hanoi.  
 
 
3. Responsibilities and resources needed at river basin level 
 
The coordinating authority at river basin scale should not be a standalone 
authority. It is important that is embedded in the Vietnamese governmental 
system with clear linkages to the national level as well to the provincial and local 
levels within the Mekong Delta area. Furthermore, the coordinating authority 
should be able to combine large scale coordination with small scale operation. 
And the authority will only be powerful if it can make use of sufficient financial 
means. Such means are necessary to set up a well equipped organisation with 
good expertise, to be an attractive employer for well-educated experts, to 
organise sufficient information that is needed to support the right measures. We 
know that already a South Western Coordination Authority (Ban Chi Dao Tay Nam 
Bo) for the Mekong Delta exists. However, this coordinating body lacks the 
resources that are needed for effective coordination. It also lacks the 
requirements for an effective Delta coordination as described above.  
 
Following this reasoning, improvements can be made in the following ways: 
• Assign sufficient responsibilities to the Delta Commissioner and its 
coordinating authority for the Mekong Delta. The authority should be able to 
guide stakeholder processes, to guide the process that should lead to powerful 
collective choices, to guide provincial and local decision makers, to guide 
redistributions of property and (land)use rights, to control progress and take 
the right measures for effective operations. 
• Provide a system through which the coordinating authority could build up 
financial funds. Water governance in the Mekong Delta cannot sufficiently rely 
on international funds. It should get sufficient budget from internal sources 
within the country. In general, one could think of two systems. One system is 
based on cost recovery through a profit principle. This means that those who 
have an interest in water governance and profit from it, also pay for it (think 
of recovery by use functions who profit through economic development). Such 
an option should be based on equal and fair distribution of risks, benefits and 
costs. Another system is based on cost recovery through a solidarity principle. 
This means that the costs of water governance are recovered form the 
national budget or provincial budgets. The Ministry of Planning and 
Investment (MPI) plays a crucial role in this option: water governance and 
delta measures should be approved than by that ministry. 
• Set up an organisation at river basin level with sufficient organisational 
capacity. Such an organisation should be able to invest in human resources. It 
should be an attractive employer where well-educated experts want to work, 
and where they are sufficiently paid. It should be an organisation that is 
sufficiently equipped to manage large scale coordination activities as well as 
small scale operations in the Delta. 
• Set up management of information resources. Not only the availability of data 
needs attention (there are still many white spots), but also the accessibility of 
data (institutions possessing data don’t have an open data policy). Sufficient 
data, rights data, access to data are crucial for the success of Delta 
coordination. It should be based on systems for forecasting, monitoring, 
evaluation, policy learning.  
 
 
